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ABSTRACT
In recent years, the number of publications that analyze the formation and stabil-
ity of international environmental agreements (IEAs) using the method of game
theory has sharply increased. This paper reports on some recent results that shall
demonstrate the usefulness but also the limitation of game theory for the analysis
of IEAs. It restricts attention to the class of non-cooperative membership models
and focuses on the relation between different designs and the success of IEAs.
Results are illustrated for the climate change problem with the empirical Stability
of Coalitions (STACO) model developed by Dellink et al. (2004). Subsequently,
some features of actual treaty-making not considered with this model are dis-
cussed with reference to the literature and their importance for future research is
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1 INTRODUCTION
Since the early papers by Barrett (1994), Carraro and Siniscalco (1993), Chander and
Tulkens (1992), Hoel (1992), and Mäler (1989) there is a sharply increasing num-
ber of publications that analyze the formation and stability of international environ-
mental agreements (IEAs) using game theory.1 This is not surprising for at least two
reasons.
First, environmental problems with an international dimension become more and
more threatening and receive an increasing coverage in politics, themedia and the public.
Topics range from the loss of biological diversity, the depletion of the ozone layer and
more recently the concern about the impacts of global warming. All these environmental
problems make joint and coordinate action at a global scale necessary in order to prevent
the most severe damages to nature and mankind. However, despite good intentions
and many public statements by politicians, progress is often slow: free-riding is still
the most important obstacle for successful IEAs.2 In order to mitigate free-riding, it is
important to understand the strategic considerations of the actors causing transboundary
environmental externalities for which game theory is an ideal method.
Second, game theory is a mathematical method that studies the interaction between
agents based on behavioral assumptions about the preference of agents andmakes predic-
tion about the outcome of these interactions by applying various equilibrium concepts.
Thus, game theory seems to be an ideal tool to study IEAs as they provide a public good
with transboundary externalities from which nobody can be excluded. In particular, the
use of non-cooperative game theory seems suggestive, presuming the absence of a “third
party” able to enforce contracts: though global rationality would call for cooperation,
individual rationality often stipulates free-riding behavior since there is no suprana-
tional institution that can enforce participation in IEA and compliance with agreed
obligations.
However, there still maybe some scholars that do not share my enthusiasm for game
theory. For instance, they could point out that game theoretic analyses are being based
on too abstract models and assuming too much about the rationality of agents. As to the
ﬁrst point, I would argue that abstraction is a general phenomenon of models in social
1 For a survey see for instance Folmer and de Zeeuw (1999, 2000), Folmer and van Mouche (2000),
Finus (2001, 2003a), Wagner (2001), and Barrett (2003), Bohringer and Finus (2005).
2 Climate change is a good point in case. The Framework Convention on Climate Change called for
actions to prevent severe damages to the climate. However, this treaty is only a declaration of good
intentions without speciﬁc abatement obligations, which may explain that it has been signed by
almost all countries in 1992. In 1997, only 38 states accepted emission ceilings within the Kyoto
Protocol. It went not into force until 2002, after the USA had withdrawn their signature and several
concessions to the original abatement targets had been granted to various participants. Current
emission levels suggest that many signatories will not be able to meet even these modest obligations
in the commitment period 2008–2012 (e.g., Böhringer andFinus 2005). Other examples which prove
that participation and compliance is a problem when dealing with global environmental problems
are provided in Barrett (2003) and Finus (2003a), Section 2.
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sciences. On the one hand, abstraction is necessary to unveil the gist of the problem.
Moreover, including too many aspects and layers of a problem renders a model too
complex for deriving sensible conclusions. On the other hand, it is certainly true that the
simplifying assumptions have to be critically checked whether they really capture the
heart of the problem under investigation. In the course of such a review, it seems wise to
replace simplifying by more realistic assumptions only sequentially in order to be able
to handle such complications.
As to the second point, the deﬁnition of rationality becomes important. If irrationality
means that agents do not base their actions exclusively on economic variables in a narrow
sense, I would certainly agreewith this critique. After all,models that deﬁne rationality in
such a narrow sense frequently fail to explain important real world phenomena.However,
if irrationality means that agents’ behavior is not related to their preferences, which may
include a preference for some notion of equity and fairness, I believe a scientiﬁc analysis is
not possible anymore. In particular, the question arises which assumption should replace
rationality and on which grounds it can be founded.
In this paper, I report on some selected results that have been obtained with recent
developments in game theory. The aim is three-fold. First, I would like to demonstrate
how models can account for more realistic assumptions and what the insights from such
an analysis are. Second, I want to show that there is still sufﬁcient room for developing
current models further within the boundaries of rationality in a wider sense. Third,
I want to identify the limitations of current models, explaining the challenges for future
research, hoping to initiate new ideas for improvement.
In the following, I proceed as follows. In Section 2, I will ﬁrst give a brief overview
of game theoretic models on IEAs that deal with the problems of participation (mem-
bership models) and compliance (compliance models). Then I describe membership
models in more detail as this is the class of games to which I will restrict myself in
this paper. In Section 3, I analyze how the design of IEAs is related to their suc-
cess using results derived from the Stability of Coalition Model (STACO-model). The
STACO model comprises an empirical climate module with twelve world regions and
a game theoretic module computing stable coalitions — the technical term for stable
environmental agreements. In Section 4, I discuss some aspects not considered in the
STACO model but which may prove important for future research. Overall, the discus-
sion will be much centered around emission problems, in particular, related to climate
change.
2 THE THEORY OF COALITION MODELS
2.1 Introduction
Up to now, no coalition model captures all aspects of coalition formation. This concerns
not only some institutional details of treaties (e.g., instruments of implementation like
emission taxes or permits or exceptions and transition periods granted to least devel-
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oped countries regarding implementation of abatement targets and time tables) and
political aspects of negotiations (e.g., intervention of various interest groups in favor or
against high abatement targets), but also the fundamentals of the game theoretic anal-
yses of IEAs — the two types of free-rider incentives (Finus, 2003a). The ﬁrst type
refers to the incentive not to participate in an IEA; the second type to the incentive
not to comply with the obligations agreed upon in an IEA. Membership models focus
on the ﬁrst type of free-rider incentive. Implicitly, they assume that once a country
joins an agreement it will comply with the agreed treaty obligations. Thus, compli-
ance is exogenous. In contrast, compliance models concentrate on the second type of
free-rider incentive, starting from the exogenous assumption that some coalition has
formed and test whether treaty obligations can be enforced with credible threats to sanc-
tion non-compliance. Hence, I conclude that the current models are limited in their
scope and that there is a need to develop models that capture both types of free-rider
incentives.3
Moreover, membership and compliance models have in common that they make some
exogenous assumptions about the institutional details of the design of an agreement.
These assumptions concern for instance the choice of the aggregate level of abatement
implemented within a coalition, the allocation among its members, the amount and
direction of transfer payments among coalition members. Thus, despite many models
comparing the outcome of different institutional arrangements, one has to be aware that
not all choices are endogenized. This is not a critique, as the complexity of these models
requires some simpliﬁcation, but simply an acknowledgment of the limitation of these
models. It is also important to point out that almost all models assume the players in the
game to be countries. That is, the political decision process within a country is neglected
and the representatives of a country de facto behave as benevolent dictators in the sense
of welfare economics. I will later comment on this assumption in Section 4.
2.2 Membership Models
Two strands of membership models for the analysis of IEAs have been distinguished in
the literature (Tulkens, 1998, Finus, 2003a): cooperative and non-cooperative. Contri-
butions using cooperative game theory have predominantly used the stability concept
of the core; those using non-cooperative game theory have mainly used the concept of
internal and external stability and modiﬁcations of it.4 The textbook deﬁnition suggests
3 The relation between both types of models is analyzed in Barrett (1999). De Zeeuw (2007) may be
seen as a preliminary attempt to include participation and compliance in one model.
4 The cooperative approach in environmental economics was initiated by Chander and Tulkens
(1992) and the non-cooperative by Barrett (1994), Carraro and Siniscalco (1993), and Hoel (1992).
Subsequent papers are reviewed in Finus (2003a). Roughly speaking, the core requires that no
subgroup of countries can raise a valid objection against a coalition and the payoffs each member
receives (called an imputation). Since the grand coalition generates the largest cooperative surplus
in the context of externalities, only the grand coalition can be in the core. Hence, the test for “core-
stability” comes down to test whether for a particular allocation of the cooperative surplus in the
grand coalition (i.e., a coalition of all countries) a subgroup of countries could deviate by obtaining
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that cooperative in contrast to non-cooperative game theory assumes a third party that
can enforce an agreement. Following this deﬁnition was to imply that cooperative game
theory models would not be suited to analyze the problems of cooperation in interna-
tional pollution control. However, I believe this categorization of models is misleading
and the implied conclusion is premature for two reasons. First, also the cooperativemod-
els test whether coalition members have an incentive to leave the coalition, considering
reactions of the remaining players that imply an implicit punishment. For instance, the
γ-core assumes that once a group of countries leaves a coalition, the remaining countries
play their non-cooperative emission strategy. Second, also most non-cooperative mod-
els make heroic assumptions about the sense for cooperation among coalition members
when choosing their emission strategies (seemore on this below).Moreover, both strands
assume full compliance with abatement obligations once a coalition has formed, which
is typically associated with the notion of cooperative game theory.
Regardless whether cooperative and non-cooperative game theory is an adequate ter-
minology, and ignoring the challenge to ﬁnd a better one, I think there are at least three
reasons to argue that the non-cooperative approach is superior.
First, taking the fact of a missing supranational authority seriously in models means
to undertake the effort to include as many non-cooperative elements as possible into
a game theoretic model on IEAs. In particular, consistency requires that the behavior
of countries or their representatives is derived from individual optimization. However,
it is important to point out that this does not preclude that countries are interested in
cooperation. Even if agents behave selﬁshly in a strict sense, in the presence of exter-
nalities, individual optimization requires some form of cooperation or coordination.
Moreover, ethical and moral motives can be considered by making it part of individuals’
objective functions, which are frequently called payoff functions in the game theoretic
literature.
Second, recent developments in non-cooperative membership models have shown
that this approach is more general and more transparent in terms of assumptions by
separating the rules of coalition formation from stability concepts (see Bloch, 2003,
Finus, 2003a, 2003b for overviews). This more general approach also allows replicating
the assumptions and results of the cooperative approach.5
a larger aggregate payoff among the deviators. Whether such an “objection” pays depends (apart
from the surplus sharing rule) on the reaction of the non-deviating countries which I call implicit
punishment and for which I provide examples below. Internal and external stability means that no
single country likes to join or leave a coalition, given that the remaining players do not change their
membership strategy and adjust their abatement strategy in their own best (myopic) interest. This
concept will be explained in more detail below. The interested reader is referred to Finus (2003a)
for an extensive discussion of the core and internal & external stability concept.
5 For instance in Finus and Rundshagen (2006a) it is shown that the γ-core resembles strong Nash
equilibrium coalition structures in a game which they call exclusive membership H-game. This
alternative approach makes it for instance transparent that a stable coalition structure has to be
immune not only to a deviation by a single player but also by any subgroup of players and this is asso-
ciated with the stability concept. A deviation implies that the coalition to which the deviators belong
but also all other other coalitions break apart. This reaction is associated with the membership rule.
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Third, the potential for explaining real world phenomena of IEAs is much higher
for the non-cooperative than for the cooperative approach (as used up to now). By def-
inition, in the context of externalities, only the grand coalition (i.e., the coalition of
all countries) implementing the socially optimal abatement target can be stable in the
sense of the core.6 As most papers (e.g., Chander and Tulkens, 1995, 1997) show, this
is indeed the case provided an adequate transfer scheme is implemented. The reason is
that the implicit punishment implied by the core concept is very strong. For instance,
the γ-core assumes after a group of countries have deviated that all other players play
their Nash equilibrium abatement strategy. Other core concepts assume even stronger
punishments like minimax or maximin strategies (see Tulkens, 1998, Finus, 2003a for
details). Ignoring the discussion whether this punishment is credible or whether alter-
native assumptions (e.g., all non deviating players could choose abatement strategies
which are optimal in their joint interest) are more convincing, it is evident that cur-
rent versions of this concept cannot contribute much to explain the existing problems
of global environmental cooperation. Of course, one may point out that the core is a
normative and not a positive concept. However, then the question arises whether we
still and repeatedly have to be reminded that the benchmark to solve transboundary
externalities is full cooperation.7 I suppose this is known also to non-game theorists and
is not even debated among environmental and ecological economists as well as scientists
of other disciplines. What seems controversial is the identiﬁcation of the problems that
prevent full cooperation or even partial cooperation and the measures to overcome these
obstacles. A small contribution from a (non-cooperative) game theorist’s point of view is
offered below.
2.3 The Construction of Non-cooperative Membership Models
Table 1 shows the basic structure of non-cooperative membership models. In the ﬁrst
stage, countries decide upon their participation; in the second stage, they decide upon
abatement and possible transfers. The decision about participation leads to a coalition
structure, which is a partition of countries in disjoint sets.8 For given assumptions about
6 See footnote 4.
7 It certainly has to be argued that the normative merit of the cooperative approach lies in searching
for optimal transfer schemes in order to mitigate free-rider incentives. This merit becomes apparant
when noting that the Chander and Tulkens sharing rule proposed in Chander and Tulkens (1995,
1997) has been applied for instance in Barrett (2001), Eyckmans and Finus (2006a, 2006b) and has
inspired the development of similar transfer rules for instance in Eyckmans and Finus (2004) in the
context of the non-cooperative approach.
8 This means that a coalition structure comprises of coalitions. A coalition with only a single country
is called singleton. Henceforth, I only use the term “coalition” for a non-trivial coalition of at
least two countries. In non-technical terms, this is referred to as an agreement. If all countries are
singletons, I call this the singleton coalition structure and if all countries form one coalition, I call
this the grand coalition.
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Table 1. Structure of coalition formation in membership models∗
1. Stage: participation
Sequence Simultaneous Sequential
No revision of members revision of members
Agreements Single Multiple
Membership Open Exclusive
Majority Unanimity
2. Stage: abatement and transfers
Sequence Simultaneous (Cournot) Sequential (Stackelberg)
Abatement Joint welfare maximization Bargaining
(Efﬁcient) Majority Unanimity
Transfers No Yes
Payoffs Objective Subjective
Social planner Politician
Material Non-material
Certain Uncertain
∗Base assumptions are underlined, alternative assumptions as reported in Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 in
Section 3 are indicated italic. All other alternative assumptions are discussed in Section 4.
the decisions in the second stage, roughly speaking, a coalition structure is called stable
if no country has an incentive to revise its participation decision.9,10
Within each stage, different assumptions can be made. I ﬁrst describe the archetype
of non-cooperative membership models, which I call henceforth the base model, and of
which the assumptions are underlined inTable 1 towhich I henceforth refer to as the base
assumptions. The base model assumes that countries simultaneously decide whether to
join an IEA. This is a one-shot decision. Hence, if a model considers a dynamic payoff
9 In the context of the archetype of coalition model that I describe below, this stability concept has
been called internal and external stability following d’Aspremont et al. (1983). That is, no member
has an incentive to leave the coalition (i.e., agreement) to become a singleton, and no outsider has an
incentive to join the coalition. This corresponds to a Nash equilibrium in member strategies. There
are also more sophisticated equilibrium concepts. However, I ignore these technical reﬁnements
in the following because they are of minor applied relevance. See for instance Bloch (2003) and
Finus (2001) overviews. Probably one of the most interesting conceptual extensions is the concept
of farsighted stability as discussed in Diamantoudi and Sartzetaki (2007), Eyckmans (2003) and
Ray and Vohra (1999). Roughly speaking, different from internal & external stability, players take
all possible chain reactions into account when deviating where reactions are not only optimal in a
myopic sense but in a farsighted sense.
10 Note that the singleton coalition structure is stable in the sense of a Nash equilibrium by deﬁnition.
Suppose all countries announce not to join the agreement, then a deviation by a single country
(announcing to join the agreement) makes no difference — this requires at least a deviation by two
countries.
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structure (as for instance the climatemodels reported in Section 3.1), a one-shot decision
has to be based on discounted payoffs. Moreover, the base model assumes that there is
only a single agreement where those countries that do not join the agreement remain
as singletons (frequently called non-signatories in the literature); all other countries are
members of the agreement (frequently called signatories in the literature). Nobody can
be denied the access to the agreement, which is termed open membership.
Once a coalition has formed, it is assumed that all countries simultaneously choose
their abatement levels, which is termed the Cournot-assumption in the literature. Coali-
tion members choose their abatement as to maximize the aggregate payoff to their
coalition, every non-member maximizes its own payoff. This means that coalition mem-
bers internalize all externalities within their coalition, i.e., abatement is efﬁcient within
the coalition, but they ignore the externalities imposed on countries outside their coali-
tion. Speciﬁcally, the coalitional abatement level is optimal for the coalition and the
allocation among its members is cost-effective.11 Hence for this assumption if the grand
coalition were to form, it would implement socially optimal abatement levels. If no coali-
tion formed (i.e., the singleton coalition structure formed), this would correspond to
non-cooperative abatement levels, also frequently called Nash equilibrium. Any coali-
tion comprising more than one but less than all members may be regarded as partial
cooperation. The base model assumes no transfers to correct for a possible asymmetric
welfare distribution. Moreover, the decisions in the second stage are taken by represen-
tatives acting like social planners of individual countries; they are only based on costs
and beneﬁts from abatement (material payoffs), which are knownwith certainty and have
been objectively estimated based on current scientiﬁc evidence.
In the following, I consider modiﬁcations of the base assumptions. In Section 3,
I concentrate on those alternative assumptions for which results have been obtained with
the STACO model. In Section 4, I discuss all remaining alternative assumptions listed
in Table 1.
3 RESULTS FROM THE STACO MODEL
3.1 Introduction
In recent years, a couple of climate models have been used in order to study the prospects
of cooperation. Examples include for instance Babiker (2001), Tol (2001), Böhringer
and Löschel (2006), Buchner and Carraro (2005a), Kempfert (2005), and Guo et al.
(2006). Most of these models are computable general equilibrium (CGE) integrated
assessment models that capture the feedback between the economy and damages from
climate change. In order to study stability of agreements, these models have to be linked
to a game theoretic module of coalition formation. For instance, the CLIMNEG World
Simulation model (CWS model) is a modiﬁcation of the RICE model by Nordhaus and
Yang (1996) and stable coalitions are determined with algorithms programmed with the
11 With coalitional abatement I mean the aggregate abatement level of the coalition.
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software package GAMS (e.g., Eyckmans and Finus (2006a) and Eyckmans and Tulkens
(2003)).
For obvious reasons, CGE-models have been subjected to much criticism, starting
from their assumptions about parameter values, the simple way in which they capture
the climate and many other things (Scrieciu, 2006). I will not challenge this criticism
at this stage; in fact will add some other points in Section 4. Instead, I want to point
out that as long as we are not capable of solving most of the interesting coalition models
analytically, we have to rely on simulations. Hence, the only question remains whether
simulations should be based on some scientiﬁcally estimated parameters according to
the current state of the art or whether some arbitrary parameters should be cooked up.
Given this limited choice, I would opt for the ﬁrst possibility. However, although these
climate models produce quantitative results, by and large, only qualitative conclusions
should be derived and this always with a grain of salt.
In the following, I present results obtained with the STACO model12 as this allows me
to draw on the largest set of simulations obtained for different treaty designs but for the
same set of parameter values. Compared with most other climate models, the STACO
model is richer in that the world is divided not only into 6 but 12 world regions. Clearly
in order to capture the incentives of individual countries for cooperation, the larger
the set of countries, the more accurate can these incentives be studied. Regions in the
STACO model include USA, Japan, European Union (EU-15), Other OECD countries
(O-OECD),Central andEasternEuropean countries (EE), Former SovietUnion (FSU),
Energy exporting countries (EEX), China, India, Dynamic Asian economies (DAE),
Brazil and “Rest of the world” (ROW).13 As with most coalition models, the (one-shot)
decision aboutmembership is based on discounted payoffs. However, in contrast to other
climate models, STACO is simpler by restricting the emission path to be constant over
time.14 Nevertheless, all qualitative conclusions uponwhich I report below are conﬁrmed
by the results derived with the CWS model — a fully-ﬂedged CGE-model.15 Moreover,
12 This model has been developed by Dellink et al. (2004). The subsequent results are compiled from
Finus et al. (2004, 2005, 2006), Weikard et al. (2006), and Altamirano-Cabrera et al. (2008).
13 EU-15 comprises the 15 countries of the European Union as of 1995. O-OECD includes among
other countries Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. EE includes for instance Hungary, Poland,
and Czech Republic. EEX includes for example the Middle East Countries, Mexico, Venezuela and
Indonesia. DAE comprises South Korea, Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore. ROW includes for
instance South Africa, Morocco and many countries in Latin America and Asia. The categorization
follows Babiker et al. (2001).
14 The bias introduced by this assumption is of minor importance as long as the decisions about
membership is a one-shot decision and based on discounted payoffs. (It would be inappropriate for
instance when the interest would be on studying optimal emission paths over time or analyzing a
dynamic coalition formation process as in Rubio and Ulph (2007).) Note that in the STACO model
overall magnitudes about accumulated emissions are calibrated such that they are in line with those
of RICE.
15 See Eyckmans and Finus (2006a, 2006b, 2007) where the issues (a) single versus multiple coali-
tions, (b) open versus exclusive membership, and (c) various transfer schemes, which I discuss
subsequently, are also considered. Only the issue efﬁcient abatement versus bargaining has not been
considered with the CWS model.
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in all papers mentioned under the STACO and CWS model in footnotes 12 and 15,
respectively, sensitivity analyses have been conducted which conﬁrmed all qualitative
conclusions. This points to the robustness of qualitative conclusions.
3.2 Results
3.2.1 General Observations
In order to disucss some general observations, the reader is referred to Table 2. At this
stage it sufﬁces to note that various coalition structures are listed in column 1 with
associated global abatement and global welfare in column 8 and 9, respectively.
In the presence of externalities, the potential gain from cooperation can be large. This
is evident for instance by showing that global welfare in the global optimum is three
times larger than in the Nash equilibrium.16 But also partial cooperation can make a
difference. For instance, a coalition of industrialized countries could raise global welfare
by more than 50 percent compared to no cooperation which drops to 35 percent without
the United States. It is also evident that not only the sheer number of participants
is important for global welfare but also the identity of membership. For instance, a
coalition of energy exporting countries (EEX) and China leads to a higher global welfare
than a coalition between Former Soviet Union (FSU), Brazil, and ROW. Generally, the
importance of the identity for cooperation can be linked to two effects. Countries with
a ﬂat marginal abatement cost curve, like China, the United States, and India in this
model, keep abatement costs low in a given coalition. The reason is that China and India
produce their goods relatively dirty and could therefore reduce their greenhouse gas
emissions at low cost. But also the United States has plenty of opportunities for energy
saving or energy substitution technologies at relatively low cost. Countries with high
marginal beneﬁts from global abatement, like EU-15, United States, and Japan in this
model, push for high coalitional abatement in a given coalition from which not only
coalition members but also non-members beneﬁt.
3.2.2 Open versus Exclusive Membership and Single versus Multiple Coalitions
We consider now the ﬁrst set of alternative assumptions as displayed inTable 2. Columns
2 to 7 indicate stable coalitions where “n” stands for not stable, “y” for stable and “-”
stands for not deﬁned. “OM” means open membership, “EM-MV” means exclusive
membership with majority voting and “EM-UV” refers to exclusive membership with
unanimity voting. Under open membership players are free to join any coalition, under
exclusive membership this is only possible if a majority (EM-MV) or all (EM-UV) are
in favor of accession (i.e., it raises the members’ payoffs). For each of these membership
rules, a version is considered where only a single coalition can form, denoted by S, and a
16 In most CGE-models this difference is usually smaller in relative terms. See for instance Eyckmans
and Finus (2006a) and Nordhaus and Yang (1996).
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version where multiple coalitions can form, denoted by M. Hence the base assumptions
are displayed in column 2. In the sequel, I ﬁrst assume a single coalition and analyze the
issue open versus exclusive membership. Then I move on to multiple coalitions.
For this model, no coalition is stable for the base assumptions (see column 2). This
changes with exclusive membership (see columns 4 and 6). In the example, majority
voting leads to one stable coalition (see column 4) and unanimity voting implies three
stable coalitions (see column 6). This goes along with higher global welfare and higher
global abatement. If we allow for multiple coalitions (i.e., move from column 6 to 7),
then for unanimity voting the success of cooperation improves even more.17
For the understanding of these results, it is helpful to note the following relations.
Given that regions in this model have a very heterogeneous cost-beneﬁt structure, in
the absence of transfers, an efﬁcient allocation of abatement duties within a coalition of
heterogeneous partners leads to an asymmetric distribution of the gains from coopera-
tion. This may imply that even some members are worse off than without cooperation.
For instance, in most coalitions of which China is a member of a coalition, she has to
contribute much to the joint abatement level (because of her ﬂat marginal abatement
cost curve), but beneﬁts only little (because of low marginal beneﬁts). In contrast, a
region like the EU-15 contributes little to joint abatement (because of her steep marginal
abatement cost curve), but beneﬁts much (because of high marginal beneﬁts). Thus, if
at all, only coalition structures with coalitions that are comprised of members with a
similar cost-beneﬁt structure can be stable. Otherwise, a disadvantaged coalition mem-
ber would simply leave the coalition. That is, internal stability of a coalition would be
violated. It is for this reason that regardless of the treaty design (open versus exclusive
membership, single versus multiple coalitions), there is no stable coalition including the
major industrialized regions, like United States, EU-15, and Japan, and at the same time
non-industrialized regions, like China, India, and ROW.
By the same token, advantaged countries have an incentive to join a coalition. That is,
external stability would be violated. It is this last feature which explains why exclusive
membership can make a difference compared to open membership. Not surprisingly,
unanimity voting makes it easier than majority voting to keep advantaged countries out.
For instance suppose there is a coalition S and an outsider joins such that coalition
S ∪{i} forms. If this was to the disadvantage to the members of S, then they would leave
17 The idea to consider multiple coalitions in the context of IEAs goes back to Carraro (2000). An
analytical analysis of single versus multiple coalitions in the context of symmetric countries under
various assumptions about membership rules is conducted in Carraro and Marchiori (2003), Finus
(2003b), and Finus and Rundshagen (2003). These papers conﬁrm the superiority of multiple
compared to a single agreements as this is also done by Asheim et al. (2006) in a compliance model.
A different conclusion is reached in Bosello et al. (2003) and Buchner and Carraro (2005b) with
the FEEM-RICE model. However, this seems to be due to some bizarre assumptions about the
abatement level and allocation chosen within coalitions. For instance, Bosello et al. (2003) report
that no multiple coalition structure is coalitionally rational (which they call weakly proﬁtable). This
means that the aggregate payoff of a group of countries decreases when they cooperate. This result is
even more surprising because in a multiple coalition setting coalition members should beneﬁt from
the abatement activities of other coalitions.
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coalition S ∪ {i}, i.e., coalition S ∪ {i} would not be internally stable. In other words,
indirectly, exclusive membership helps to internally stabilize coalitions which leads to
more stable coalitions.
For a single agreement, the participation decision is only yes or no. Due to strong free-
rider incentives, the decision is often no and hence only small and few coalitions are stable
if at all. Hence, if a country does not want to join the main crowd, it would opt to remain
a singleton. Now with multiple coalitions, it has a second option — forming another
agreement with like-minded countries. For instance, the coalition of FSU, Brazil, and
ROW is stable for exclusive membership and unanimity voting if only a single agreement
can be formed (see column 6). If multiple coalitions are possible, other regions have
an incentive to form their own agreement. Hence, the coalition structure with only a
coalition of FSU, Brazil, and ROW is no longer stable. However, ﬁve other coalition
structures are stable including a coalition with these three regions.
Taken together, Table 2 allows for two major policy conclusions. First, the open
membership rule as applied in almost every international environmental treaty should
not be taken for granted. Club good agreements (e.g., NATO, European Union, and
WTO) may not only enjoy a higher stability and success because the beneﬁts from
contributions are exclusive tomembers (which is different for IEAs, which can be viewed
as public good agreements), but also because accession is limited through majority or
unanimity voting. As explained above, this helps to stabilize coalitions. Put differently,
the requirement to take decisions by consensus (which is an integral feature of exclusive
membership) may not always be an obstacle for successful cooperation — a conclusion
that will be conﬁrmed in a slightly different context below.
Second, the effort to get as many countries as possible into one “climate boat” may
not be the best strategy in the presence of free-rider incentives. Allowing for separate
agreements among regions that have similar interests may foster the success of inter-
national agreements. In this light, the position of the United States only to ratify the
Kyoto Protocol if developing countries would also join the protocol and take on climate
responsibility is open to criticism.18 However, their announcement in the aftermaths
of their withdrawal that they would pursue their own climate policy cooperating with
countries of similar interests may be viewed less critically. At least as an intermediate
step, multiple agreements may be useful on the way to a global treaty as this is often the
case with regional trade agreements that lead to more comprehensive agreements at later
stages, for instance under the umbrella of the WTO.
3.2.3 Transfers
Table 3 illustrates the role of transfers. In order to separate effects, all other base assump-
tions are retained (i.e., single agreement, open membership). Generally, transfers can
18 In 1997, the US Senate unanimously passed the Byrd–Hagel resolution, which makes “meaning-
ful” participation of developing countries a conditio sine qua non for ratiﬁcation (The Byrd–Hagel
Resolution, US Senate, June 12, 1997, 105th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Resolution 98).
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Table 3. The role of sharing scheme: Stable coalitions with transfers∗
Transfer scheme
Coalition
members
Global abatement
% BAU
Global welfare
bln US$
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Global Optimum Grand coalition# 21.4 6,031
(1) GDP EU-15, China 7.3 2,942
(2) Emissions USA, EE, EEX,
China
8.6 3,418
(3) Equal Sharing EE, China, India 5.9 2,499
(4) Ability to Pay China, India 5.5 2,334
(5) Inverse Emissions EE, Brazil 4.6 1,981
2,059
}
(2,020)China, Brazil 4.8
(6) Population EEX, China 5.2 2,190
Nash Equilibrium Singleton coalition
structure
4.6 1,960
∗Base assumptions as indicated in Table 1 if not stated otherwise. For the general construction
of outcome-based transfer schemes, see footnote 20. The weights for the six transfer schemes are
deﬁned as follows: GDP: λi = GDPi/
∑
j∈S GDPj ; Emissions: λi = Ei/
∑
j∈S Ej ; Equal Shar-
ing: λi = 1/#S; Ability to Pay: (GDPi/POPi)−1/
∑
j∈S (GDPj/POPj )−1; Inverse Emissions:
λi = E−1i /
∑
j∈S (Ej )−1; Population: λi = POPi/
∑
j∈S POPj with GDP= gross domestic product,
E =BAU-emissions, #S = size of coalition S, POP= population; all values refer to 2010, seeWeikard
et al. (2006) for details. Abbreviations of regions as explained in Section 3.1. # = no stable coalition.
Global Abatement and Global Welfare as deﬁned in Table 2.
be implemented in many ways. For instance, they can be paid in cash, can be designed
as technological transfers or be part of political concessions in other policy ﬁelds (often
referred to as issue linkage). I consider here only monetary transfers and only report
on outcome-based rules.19 That is, the total surplus of cooperation within a coalition is
distributed according to weights which sum up to one.20
19 In the literature (e.g., Rose et al. 1998), monetary transfers have been categorized into outcome-
based, allocation-based, and process-based rules. The names refer to the main motivation for a
transfer rule. For instance, outcome-based rules are earmarked to generate a particular outcome
and hence the surplus from cooperation is shared in some way (see the subsequent footnote). In
contrast, allocation-based rules focus on the initial allocation as this is for instance the case for the
initial allocation of emission permits. Allocation-based rules are considered in Altamirano-Cabrera
and Finus (2006) with the STACO model; process-based rules are analyzed in Bosello et al. (2003)
with the RICE-FEEM model.
20 Let S denote an arbitrary coalition, SN the singleton coalition structure corresponding to the
Nash equilibrium, and πi(S) the payoff of country i without transfers if coalition S forms, then
the payoff of a coalition member i ∈ S with transfer, πTi (S), is given by πTi (S) = πi(SN ) +
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Among themanypossible criteria according towhichweights canbederived, I consider
six schemes in Table 3 which are deﬁned in the legend of this table.21 The ﬁrst two
schemes may be called pragmatic (GDP and Emissions) whereas schemes 3 to 6 can
be linked to some notion of equity (Equal Sharing, Ability to Pay, Inverse Emissions,
and Population). The pragmatic schemes more or less preserve the status quo and
therefore have also been called sovereignty rules.22 They favor industrialized countries
with high current emissions and GDP. “Equal Sharing” simply splits the cooperative pie
equally. “Ability to Pay” assumes weights inverse to the GDP/Population ratio. Thus,
international pollution control serves as a vehicle of income redistribution. This scheme
gives muchweight to highly populated and/or poor regions. “Inverse emissions” appeals
to the principle of historical responsibility for climate change and “Population” is based
on the principle of “one man one vote.” Both schemes also favor developing countries
and countries in transition as they have relatively low current emissions and a large
population. The Nash Equilibrium and the Global Optimum are listed in Table 3 as
benchmarks for the evaluation of the success of the various transfer schemes. In the case
of multiple equilibria (as this is the case for the transfer scheme “Inverse Emissions”),
the average payoff over all equilibria has been computed, which is the number besides
the bracket in Table 3.
From Table 3 it is evident that the pragmatic schemes perform better (in terms of
generating stable coalitions) than the morally motivated transfer schemes. Moreover,
only for the pragmatic schemes a stable coalition emerges including industrialized and
non-industrialized regions.23 Additionally, we may recall from Table 2 that without
transfers there is no stable coalition in this model for the base assumptions. However, also
with transfers stable coalitions are relatively small and fall short of the global optimum.
This leads to two conclusions.
First, transfers are important to balance asymmetries and can improve upon the suc-
cess of cooperation. However, the fact that the grand coalition is not stable demonstrates
that they cannot completely offset free-rider incentives. Hence, the establishment of
international funds, like the Global Environmental Facility, in order to provide poorer
countries with incentives to participate in IEAs (as this is the case for the Convention on
Biological Diversity, the Montreal Protocol and the Kyoto Protocol) are important steps
for successful international environmental cooperation.
Second, successful cooperation requires participation of industrialized and non-
industrialized regions, which I call mixed membership. This can only be achieved with
moderate transfers, which take into account the fundamental interests of all actors in
λi[
∑
j∈S πj (S) −
∑
j∈S πj (SN )], where the surplus is the term in brackets, λi ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ S and∑
i∈S λi = 1.
21 For a more detailed description see Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus (2006) and Weikard et al. (2006).
22 In the context of allocation-based rules, the scheme “Emissions” would correspond to “grandfa-
thering.”
23 For allocation-based rules, as considered in Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus (2006) in the STACO
model, results are even more pronounced. Only for pragmatic rules stable coalitions exist; no
coalition is stable under any morally motivated rule considered in this paper.
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climate change. The morally motivated transfer schemes would imply large transfers
between industrialized and non-industrialized regions. Hence, no coalition of mixed
membership is stable. This is different for the pragmatic transfer scheme in this example.
For instance, the ﬁrst transfer rule GDP allows for a stable coalition between EU-15 and
China. Though China receives transfers in this coalition from EU-15, which are large
enough to provide China with an incentive for cooperation, they are small enough to
make this coalition also attractive for EU-15. It is important to note that this conclusion
depends crucially on the assumption that only material payoffs are part of countries’
objective function. Different conclusions could be reached in a model with non-material
payoffs inwhich for instance a large redistribution ofwealth or development aid generates
not only payoffs for developing but also for industrialized countries (see Section 4.5).
It is also worthwhile mentioning that I have only considered transfers within a coali-
tion. The assumption implies that an outsider joining the coalition would automatically
participate in the transfer schemes considered above. However, the assumption does not
include at least two other interesting policy options.
The ﬁrst option, though itmay sound curious, is that an outsider pays another outsider
for taking onmore climate responsibility by joining the agreement. If the payment covers
the additional abatement cost of the payee and provides the payer with a beneﬁt in excess
of his payment, this could be a viable option. For instance, this could mean that the
United States, despite of not being and not becoming a member of the Kyoto Protocol,
could ﬁnance membership of China or India in order to join this treaty. In the CWS
model of the CGE type considered in Carraro et al. (2006) it is shown that such a strategy
can work, implying a Pareto-improvement to all countries.
The second option is suggested by the current architecture of theKyoto Protocol. The
clean development mechanism (CDM) allows Annex-B-countries (i.e., mainly industri-
alized countries which accepted emission ceilings) to replace their own abatement activi-
ties by ﬁnancing abatement activities inNon-Annex-B-countries (i.e., mainly developing
countries without emission ceilings). Whether the CDM increases participation and the
success of this protocol is at least from a pure game theoretic point of view not easy to
predict. The reason is that in the absence of any strategic effects, CDMraises not only the
welfare of signatories but also of non-signatories. If the latter effect is stronger, leaving
the coalition becomes more attractive and CDM could have adverse effects. Therefore,
it would certainly be interesting to evaluate these effects in an empirical climate model.
3.2.4 Uniform Emission Reduction Quotas
Until now, an efﬁcient allocation of abatement within the coalition has been assumed.
However, in reality, in most IEAs neither is the coalitional abatement level opti-
mal nor is its allocation cost-effective. Typically, the coalitional abatement is below
optimal levels24 and abatement duties are speciﬁed as uniform emission reduction
24 This conclusion is supported for instance by empirical studies on the Montreal Protocol (Murdoch
and Sandler, 1997b), the Helsinki Protocol (Murdoch and Sandler, 1997a), the Oslo Protocol (Finus
and Tjøtta, 2003), or the Kyoto Protocol (Böhringer and Vogt, 2004).
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Table 4. The role of emission reduction quotas and bargaining: Stable coalitionswithout
trading∗
Agreement design Coalition members
Global abatement
% of BAU
Global welfare
bln US$
Global optimum Grand coalition# 21.4 6,031
(1) Efﬁcient Design — 4.6 1,960
(2) Common Quota India, ROW 5.0 2,100
(3) Median Quota
Proposal
India, ROW 5.0 2,103
(4) Lowest Quota India, ROW 4.8 2,088
2,725
}
(2,407)Proposal EU-15, China,
India, ROW
6.8
Nash Equilibrium Singleton coalition
structure
4.6 1,960
∗Agreement Design (1)–(4) as deﬁned in Section 3.2.4. # = no stable coalition. Global Abatement
and Global Welfare as deﬁned in Table 2.
quotas.25 In order to accommodate this observation and to provide a rationale for
it, I compare the “Efﬁcient Design” with three alternative treaty designs which are
called “Common Quota,” “Median Quota Proposal,” and “Lowest Quota Proposal” in
Table 4.26 (Again, the Nash Equilibrium and the Global Optimum are listed in Table 4
as benchmarks and in the case of multiple equilibria average welfare is displayed as in
Table 3). Common Quota departs from the base assumptions (which are again the start-
ing point for considering modiﬁcations) in one respect: coalitional abatement is chosen
optimally, but not cost-effectively. That is, it is assumed that the coalition maximizes
the aggregate payoff to this coalition as before but with the constraint that all members
have to reduce their emissions by the same percentage from their non-cooperative levels
(i.e., emission reduction quota). Median and Lowest Quota Proposal depart from the
base assumptions in an additional respect. The coalitional abatement level is not chosen
optimally — it is not derived from joint but from individual welfare maximization. That
is, each member makes a proposal for coalitional abatement that is optimal from its point
of view, assuming that this is implemented in the form of a uniform emission reduction
quota. If they agree on the median proposal, this corresponds to majority voting; if they
agree on the lowest proposal, this corresponds to unanimity voting.
25 The list of examples is long and includes the Helsinki Protocol, which suggested a 30 percent
reduction of sulfur emissions from 1980 levels by 1993. Moreover, the “Protocol Concerning the
Control of Emissions of Nitrogen Oxides or Their Transboundary Fluxes” signed in Soﬁa in 1988
called on countries to uniformly freeze their emissions at 1987 levels by 1995 and the “Protocol
Concerning the Control of Emissions of Volatile Organic Compounds or Their Fluxes” signed in
Geneva in 1991 required parties to reduce 1988 emissions by 30 percent by 1999.
26 The idea of uniform emission reduction quotas goes back to Endres (1997) and Eyckmans (1999).
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Since the Efﬁcient Design corresponds to the base assumptions we know from above
that no coalition is stable. For the design Common Quota and Median Quota Proposal
one coalition between India and ROW is stable. This coalition is also stable for the design
Lowest Quota Proposal but global welfare is lower. However, there is an additional stable
coalition of four regions with higher global welfare. The average global welfare for the
Lowest Quota Proposal is higher than for the other two quota designs.
It is evident that in a given coalition and abstracting from stability considerations, any
departure from the Efﬁcient Design implies a global welfare loss. This welfare loss is
particularly big in large coalitions and is particularly pronounced for the Lowest Quota
Proposal.27 However, including stability considerations, no coalition is stable for the
Efﬁcient Design without transfers. This is because this design implies an asymmetric
distribution of abatement allocation associated with an asymmetric distribution of the
gains from cooperation. Moreover, it means that an ambitious coalitional abatement
level is implemented. In contrast, the quota designs lead to a more symmetric distri-
bution of the gains from cooperation and implement more modest coalition abatement
targets which is pronounced particularly for the Lowest Quota Proposal. In the exam-
ple, the departure from cost-effectiveness and ambitious abatement targets is rewarded.
Because of strong free-rider incentives, the Lowest Quota Proposal is themost successful
design.28
This conclusion is also conﬁrmed if we allow for the possibility that quotas can be
traded within a coalition as displayed in Table 5. Since trading constitutes a win–win-
situation for all coalition members, coalitional members’ payoffs increase and hence
also global welfare for a given coalition structure.29 Hence, the difference between
the Efﬁcient Design and the three quota designs is only due to the “modesty effect,”
i.e., lower coalitional abatement levels in a given coalition since trading leads to
cost-effectiveness.30
The Pareto-improving effect of trading has two implications. First, it is less attractive
to leave a coalition. That is, internal stability is strengthened. Hence, all coalitions that
have been internally stable without trading are also internally stable with trading andmay
be some additional coalitions. This is why for instance the coalition between India and
ROW which is stable in Table 4 is also internally stable in Table 5. Second, it becomes
more attractive for outsiders to join a coalition. That is, external stability is weakened.
This is why for instance the coalition between India and ROW is no longer externally
27 For instance for the grand coalition, the Efﬁcient Design implies a global welfare of 6,031 bln
US$ (as displayed in Table 4) whereas for the designs Common Quota, Median Quota Proposal,
and Lowest Quota Proposal we ﬁnd 4589, 4565, and 3212 bln US$ (not displayed in Table 4),
respectively. See Altamirano-Cabrera et al. (2008), Table 1.
28 A similar conclusion is reached in a compliance model in Endres and Finus (2002) and Finus and
Rundshagen (1998).
29 For the grand coalition (as reported in the previous footnote), globalwelfare for the designsCommon
Quota, Median Quota Proposal, and Lowest Quota Proposal is now given by 5547, 5703, and 3345
bln US$ (not displayed in Table 5), respectively. See Altamirano-Cabrera et al. (2008), Table 1.
30 That modesty can pay is also conﬁrmed in theoretical models with symmetric players. In a mem-
bership model this is shown in Finus (2004) and in a compliance model in Barrett (2002).
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Table 5. The role of emission quotas and bargaining: Stable coalitions with trading∗
Agreement design Coalition members
Global abatement
% of BAU
Global welfare
bln US$
Global optimum Grand coalition# 21.4 6,031
(1) Efﬁcient Design — 4.6 1,960
(2) Common Quota India, ROWI 5.0 2,104
Japan, EU-15, China,
India
7,3 2,982
(3) Median Quota India, ROWI 5.0 2,104
Proposal Japan, India, ROW 5.5 2,261
2,973
3,307
3,492

 (3,008)
Japan, EU-15, China,
India
7.3
USA, Japan, China, India 8.3
USA, EU-15, China,
India
9.0
(4) Lowest Quota India, ROWI 4.8 2,088
Proposal EU-15, China, India,
ROWI
6.8 2,811
Japan, EU-15, China,
India, ROW
7.5 3,050
3,350
}
(3,200)
USA, Japan, EU-15,
China, India
8.4
Nash Equilibrium Singleton coalition
structure
4.6 1,960
∗Agreement Design (1)–(4) as deﬁned in Section 3.2.4. # = no stable coalition; I = only internally
stable coalition. Global Abatement and Global Welfare as deﬁned in Table 2.
stable with trading. However, this external instability of small coalitions is rewarded by
larger stable coalitions in this example. For all three quota designs, average global welfare
of stable coalitions with trading is higher than without trading. The ranking within the
three quota designs according to average global welfare remains the same: the highest
average global welfare is obtained for the design Lowest Quota Proposal, followed by
Median Quota Proposal and then Common Quota.
From Tables 4 and 5 the following three policy conclusions emerge, taking in consid-
eration that IEAs have to operate in a second-best world, i.e., participants face free-rider
incentives but no third party can enforce a treaty. First, in the absence of transfers, there
is a rationale for implementing uniform emission reduction quotas. Despite being not
cost-effective, quota agreements may be more successful as the gains from cooperation
are more equally shared. Second, the pressure for consensus treaties is not always an
obstacle for successful cooperation. If a sufﬁciently high participation makes up for
the negative effect of modest abatement targets, the overall effect may well be positive.
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This conclusion (“better a bird in hand than two in the bushes”) gains momentum when
considering (by taking a wider perspective) that many IEAs have been established ﬁrst
withmodest abatement targets, as for instance theMontreal Protocol on the Reduction of
CFCs. Subsequently, amendment protocols followed which gradually tightened abate-
ment targets and broadened the base of regulated pollutants.31 Third, emission trading,
as for instance established for the ﬁrst time within the Kyoto Protocol, can increase par-
ticipation and the success of a treaty. This stresses the importance of this instrument not
only for cost-effectiveness but also for the incentive of participation in IEAs.
4 POSSIBLE EXTENSIONS
4.1 Introduction
Some of the results in the previous section have a positive dimension. With positive
dimension I mean that these results help to rationalize apparently second- or third-best
designs of actual IEAs. Examples include the following conclusions: (a) uniform may
be superior to differentiated and cost-effective emission reductions (Tables 4 and 5); (b)
trading of uniform emission reduction quotas has a positive effect on participation and
efﬁcacy of IEAs (Table 5); (c) modest may be superior to ambitious emission reductions
(Tables 4 and 5). Of course, at the same time, these insights provide also some normative
guidance for the pragmatic design of future IEAs.
However, some results seem to have an exclusive normative dimension. For instance,
we concluded that (d) multiple are superior to single agreements (Table 2) and (e) exclu-
sive is superior to open membership (Table 2). Clearly, all current IEAs are single
agreements as there is for instance only one Montreal Protocol and one Kyoto Protocol.
Of course, one may argue that recent developments seem to indicate that a group of
countries around the United States may set up an additional climate treaty. However,
without any doubt, all current environmental agreements of global scale do not restrict
accession and therefore adhere to the principle of open membership. Moreover, mem-
bership in Tables 2–5 under various institutional assumptions is neither in line with
participation in the current Kyoto Protocol nor with the expectations of probably most
experts and observers on climate change. For instance, the “current Kyoto coalition,”
corresponding roughly to a coalition of Japan, European Union (EU-15), Other OECD
countries (O-OECD), Central and Eastern European Countries (EE) and the Former
Soviet Union (FSU) according to the regional classiﬁcation in the STACO model is
not stable under any of the assumptions considered here. In contrast, depending on the
assumptions, a coalition of the Former Soviet Union (FSU), Brazil, and ROW may form
a stable coalition (e.g., Table 2).
A partial answer to resolve this puzzle could be to point out that is very likely that
the Kyoto coalition will indeed turn out to be unstable as predictions suggest that many
31 See for instance the Appendix in Finus (2007).
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participants will not be able to fulﬁll their abatement obligations in the ﬁrst commit-
ment period 2008–2012. It may also be pointed out that politicians are not completely
rational, pursue other goals than maximizing the welfare of its citizens or simply do not
know for instance that exclusive is superior to open membership. After all, economists
have put forward numerous normative policy recommendations — not only in envi-
ronmental economics — that have not fallen on fertile ground. It is certainly beyond
the scope of this paper to provide a complete solution to this puzzle. However, it is
clear that a stylized model can only capture a small amount of the diverse factors that
play a role in the actual setting under which the Kyoto Protocol is operating. Some
of these factors may not even be known. Moreover, even from a purely theoretical
point of view, it is obvious that some aspects of coalition formation have been neglected
in the previous analysis. In the following, with reference to Table 1, I will discuss
some aspects which I believe are the most prompting one to be considered in future
research.32 It will become apparent some of the issues have already been treated, though
some under very speciﬁc assumptions with no general and clear-cut conclusions.
4.2 Sequential Participation Decisions
The base assumption implies that all countries decide simultaneously upon their partic-
ipation. However, casual empirical evidence suggests that signature and ratiﬁcation of
environmental treaties occur sequentially. Typically, some initiators kick off the negoti-
ation process, a core group of countries participate in an agreement and other countries
may follow suite at a later stage.33
However, modeling coalition formation as a sequential process introduces a couple of
conceptual problems that are difﬁcult to solve. For instance, in the case of heterogeneous
countries, the sequence in which countries decide upon their participation has to be
endogenized. In a model with a dynamic payoff structure, which means in particular that
the payoff at time t depends on accumulated emissions (i.e., stock of emissions or con-
centration in the context of greenhouse gases), the number of strategic options increases
dramatically. As the incentives of the game change over time, neither constant abate-
ment strategies nor participation strategies can be optimal. Whereas dynamic abatement
strategies are considered in CGE models, a truly dynamic coalition model also requires
considering dynamic participation strategies. That is, optimal abatement levels as well as
32 I will not cover at least one issue that I believe is also important in the context of IEAs. This is
the link between cooperation on environmental issues and R&D. The analysis of the link between
environmental and some other policy issues in order to improve the prospects of IEAs has been
initiated by Folmer et al. (1993) and Folmer and van Mouche (1994) in the context of compliance
models. Later contributions analyzed issue linkage also in the context of membership models as
for instance Barrett (1997) and Carraro and Siniscalco (1997). Recently, this topic has gained new
momentum with the focus on how the design of an IEA affects endogenous technological progress
and how this affects the success of an IEA. See for instance Buonanno et al. (2003), Fischer et al.
(2003), Golombek and Hoel (2005), and Kverndokk and Rosendahl (2007).
33 The evolutionary development of some IEAs is reported for instance in the appendix in Finus
(2007).
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optimal participation strategies have to be determined at each point in time in a recursive
way, anticipating the implication in the future of decisions today.
Until now only a few preliminary results are available with limited policy-relevance.
The reason is that all results have been derived from highly stylized models with sym-
metric countries34 and many other very speciﬁc assumptions.
The simplest extension assumes a sequential coalition formation process according
to the sequentially more unanimity game of Bloch (1995) as considered for instance in
Finus and Rundshagen (2006b) and Ray and Vohra (2001). In this game, membership is
exclusive and multiple coalitions may form. Once a coalition has formed by unanimous
voting, membership cannot be revised.
From these papers it appears that time introduces an additional strategic component:
countries have an incentive to commit to no or low cooperation in the early stage of
the formation process, thereby increasing the pressure on other countries for cooper-
ation. Moreover, due to strategic considerations, full cooperation may not be possible;
the equilibrium coalition structure may not even be Pareto-optimal.35 Surely, this is
hardly a surprising result and not so much different from what has been obtained with
simpler models assuming a simultaneous participation process. Moreover, contrary to
reality, the initiators are not those countries that establish an agreement but those which
free-ride.
A more interesting analysis is conducted in Rubio and Ulph (2002, 2007). Both papers
consider in the basemodel of an openmembership single coalition game a stock pollutant
and the decision about membership over time. Models are simple as countries have only
a dichotomous choice between no abatement and abatement. In the ﬁrst paper, only
two periods are considered. In line with real world observations, the authors show that
participation rises in the second period compared to the ﬁrst period. However, this seems
to be an artiﬁcial result, as the authors admit, because the ﬁnite time horizon introduces
an end point bias. In the last period (here the second period), no environmental damages
in subsequent periods have to be considered. Hence, optimal abatement is low and
participation is associated with low abatement costs. This qualiﬁcation is conﬁrmed by
the inﬁnite horizon version in the second paper. Here the authors ﬁnd that participation
is a non-increasing function of time.
Hence, it appears that only two policy-relevant conclusions can be derived from these
papers. First, under reasonable assumptions the equilibrium stock of emissions increases
over time, approaching some steady state. However, this is already known from empirical
climate models like RICE (Nordhaus and Yang, 1996) and WIAGEM (Kempfert, 2005)
though the particular focus on partial instead of full cooperation is new. Second, the
authors conﬁrm a conclusion for the assumption of efﬁcient abatement within a coalition
that not only in a static but also in a dynamic setting the success of coalition formation is
34 Symmetric players means that all players have the same payoff function. Sometimes this is also
called ex-ante symmetric players as ex-post signatories and non-signatories receive different payoffs
since they chose different abatement levels.
35 A Pareto-optimal coalition structure is a coalition structure such that there is no other coalition
structure where at least one player would be better off but no player would be worse off.
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negatively related to the level of environmental damages.36 However, despite these critical
remarks, no doubt, the research direction kicked-off by Rubio and Ulph (2002, 2007) is
an important and promising one if it is combined for instance with some ingredients I
mention below. This may allow deriving more realistic conclusions.
4.3 Sequential Abatement Decisions
The standard assumption implies that the coalition, acting as a single player, and the
outsiders, acting as singletons, simultaneously chose their optimal abatement policy. An
alternative assumption, introduced by Barrett (1994) and further developed by Diaman-
toudi andSartzetakis (2006) andRubio andUlph (2006), is that this happens sequentially.
They assume that the coalition acts as a Stackelberg leader, taking the (aggregate) best
response of outsiders in consideration, when choosing its abatement. This informational
advantage can reduce the degree of leakage and leads to larger and more successful
coalitions.37
Until now, this result has only been established for the assumption of symmetric
players and three speciﬁc payoff functions.38 Nevertheless, it seems suggestive that this
result should hold more generally. From a theoretical point of view, however, there are
two problems with this alternative assumption. First, in a model with symmetric players
and/or payoff function comprising only cost and beneﬁts from abatement, the informa-
tional asymmetry does not follow from the model itself and requires some exogenous
motivation. Second, in the special context of coalition formation, the question arises why
potential coalition members should assume that they loose their informational advantage
once they leave the coalition. From an applied point of view, the result is more inter-
esting, suggesting that successful cooperation should take in consideration the strategic
reaction of outsiders.
4.4 Subjective Payoffs
The STACO model, like other climate models, groups countries into regions for
tractability. Even though in climate negotiations some countries coordinate their strate-
gies, like the European Union or the group of G77 countries, after all, countries take
sovereign decision when it comes to accepting ﬁnal abatement targets and signing and
ratifying a treaty. This introduces a bias in the incentive structure. Anything else being
equal, we should expect that this aggregation into regions overestimates the success of
cooperation derived from climate models. This qualiﬁcation calls for a model with more
36 This result is summarized and explained in Finus (2003a) for the static setting. See in particular
Result 2 in Section 3.3.2.
37 Leakage effect means that non-signatories lower their abatement as a reaction to higher abatement
of signatories. For instance, if the members of a climate agreement reduce their energy demand,
energy prices drop, inducing higher demand by outsiders.
38 For an overview see Finus (2003a), Table 3.2, p. 108.
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disaggregated data. However, apart from the fact that more disaggregate data is cur-
rently not available, such an extension would require a substantial amount of additional
computer resources.39
Moreover, as far as I am aware, all climate models derive the parameters of their abate-
ment cost functions and beneﬁt functions from some “scientiﬁc sources.” Apart from the
difﬁculty to monetize environmental damages in general, these estimates try to evalu-
ate “objective” damages. For instance, most climate models assume high environmental
damages in developing countries summarized in the region ROW. From a normative
view point this may not be seen as a problem. However for a positive analysis, this may
introduce some bias. There are some reasons to believe that the subjective perception of
damage costs of ROW is substantially lower than those assumed in most climate models,
overestimating the interest of this heterogeneous region for cooperation. For instance,
as these countries typically prioritize economic development over environmental issues,
it can be expected that environmental damages receive a low weight.
One possibility to improve upon estimates for a positive analysis could be to use data
from contingent valuation studies to calibrate climate models. For instance, Böhringer
and Vogt (2004) suggest, based on a survey of various studies, that the willingness to
pay for global greenhouse gases is even in industrialized countries rather low. However,
it is also evident from their survey that the current data basis is very small — only few
country studies are currently available.
4.5 Political Process
The basemodel assumed that abatement within a coalition is derived from joined welfare
maximization of coalition members. As already pointed out, there are at least four prob-
lems with this assumption. First, it is not consistent with the notion of non-cooperative
game theory. Second, it certainly overestimates the sense of cooperation among govern-
ments, even though they are willing to take joint action. Third, it presumes inﬁnitely
living decision makers who take all future implications of their decisions today into con-
siderations. Fourth, already casual empirical evidence suggests that this simply does not
reﬂect what is really happening in international negotiations: coalitional abatement is
neither optimal nor is its allocation cost-effective. Certainly, one improvement to accom-
modate this critique was the previous assumption of a bargaining process over uniform
emission reduction quotas. However, this can only be seen as a ﬁrst step.
First, the set of bargaining options was restricted (e.g., Median Quota and Lowest
Quota Proposal), may not apply to all situations of international environmental negoti-
ations and the choice of the negotiation regime was not endogenized. Moreover, in the
case of transfers, though several options were considered, the choice of the transfers
scheme (i.e., the choice of weights) was not endogenized. Second, and most important,
39 In the context of only 12 world regions, there are already more than four billion different coalition
structures in the case of multiple coalitions. This number increases exponentially with the number
of regions.
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the political process that deﬁnes the positions of governments in international negotia-
tions has not been considered explicitly (e.g., Michaelowa, 1998). This shortcoming is
shared by all coalition models as far as I am aware and was noted already by Carraro
and Siniscalco (1998). Hence, one possibility to improve upon the predictive power of
coalition models could be to include public choice aspects, like interest groups, govern-
mental decision processes, and parliamentary voting. Moreover, overlapping generation
models with short-lived agents could be constructed in order to capture the myopic view
typically prevailing in politics. However, apart from increasing the complexity of models,
it should be expected that it will be difﬁcult to identify and quantify political variables
for an empirical analysis.40
4.6 Non-material Payoffs
The base assumptions imply that decisions about participation and abatement are solely
based on costs and beneﬁts from abatement (i.e., material payoffs). From a normative
(e.g., in the sense of welfare economics) as well as from a positive perspective (e.g., in
the sense of public choice) one may argue that this view is too narrow. From a normative
perspective one may argue that it is exactly for this reason why cooperation proves so
difﬁcult in reality and why game theoretic models conﬁrm this pessimistic view. From
a positive perspective there may be the conjecture that also aspects like reputation or
ethical considerations of fairness play some role when negotiating an IEA and deciding
on participation and compliance. Moreover, one may presume that these aspects are at
least partially responsible for explaining some of the success stories of IEAs, like for
instance the frequently cited Montreal Protocol.
Though the normative perspective is an extremely relevant and important issue of
non-material payoffs, scientiﬁcally it is of limited interest. Even without resorting to
non-material payoffs, full cooperation could easily be achieved in theory if all actors
would not only consider their own payoff but also the beneﬁts occurring to others from
their abatement when (a) choosing their abatement level, and (b) deciding whether to
join or leave an IEA. Then the grand coalition, implementing the social optimum, would
be the unique stable outcome. Even in a richer model, the normative dimension of the
problem would call for the complete internalization of all transboundary externalities
across all actors. That is, all actors care also for the well-being of others, regardless how
this is deﬁned. A more interesting issue is certainly the question: How is it possible to
change the preference of actors so that they consider externalities they impose on others?
This question is related to the role and formation of norms as well as reputation and
the institutions that help in shaping them. Unfortunately, as far as I am aware, no such
research in the context of IEAs has been conducted in environmental economics.
40 As far as I am aware, only Bucholz et al. (2005) and Altamirano-Cabrera (2007), Chapters 7 and 8,
consider public choice aspects in transboundary pollution. However, Bucholz et al. (2005) is a highly
stylized model with only two symmetric players. Hence, the problem of coalition formation does
not arise. The work of Altamirano-Cabrera (2007) is a very promising approach as he considers
public choice aspects and coalition formation in the STACO-model. However, the analysis must be
judged as preliminary as it appears to be ﬂawed by some inconsistent assumptions.
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The positive perspective is scientiﬁcally interesting but also difﬁcult. The main ques-
tion that arises is to which extent and in which sense do reputational and ethical aspects
guide the behavior of actors? However to the best of my knowledge, this question has
not really been addressed yet.41 On the one hand, there is a couple of theoretical papers
which have analyzed how non-material payoffs inﬂuence the success if IEAs. On the
other hand, there is one empirical paper that conducted a questionnaire among employ-
ees in governmental and international institutions involved in climate change on the
importance they attach to different notions of equity. Though this survey is important,
by its nature we should expect a bias between stated preferences and those underlying
actual negotiations.42 In the following, I brieﬂy review these papers.
Jeppesen and Andersen (1998) and Hoel and Schneider (1997) add a term to the
“classical payoff function,” which the former call a “non-material payoff,” representing
the idea of fairness, and the latter “non-environmental cost of breaking the agreement.”
They assume that all countries’ (symmetric) payoffs comprise beneﬁt minus cost from
abatement (material payoff ) but that non-participants receive additionally disutility from
being outsiders (non-material payoff ) where disutility increases with the number of
countries participating in an IEA. Not surprisingly, both papers ﬁnd that the higher
the disutility of being an outsider, the larger will be the equilibrium coalition. At least
technically, this result seems obvious, as it follows almost by assumption.43
Lange and Vogt (2003) assume that the utility of a country is the weighted sum of the
absolute material payoff function and the relative material payoff function. The relative
material payoff function obtains its maximum for the average payoff of all countries. Any
deviation from the arithmetic mean is interpreted as inequality and counts as disutility.
For the assumption of symmetric countries, they show that if relative payoffs receive a
sufﬁciently high weight compared to absolute payoffs, the grand coalition emerges as an
equilibrium coalition. Unfortunately, they do not analyze which equilibrium emerges
if relative payoffs receive some weight but not sufﬁciently much in order to stabilize
the grand coalition. Instead, they run simulations for a particular beneﬁt and cost func-
tion assuming that there are 12 countries in total of which half care exclusively about
absolute payoffs (A-countries) and half of them care exclusively about relative payoffs
41 There are only few empirical studies on the behavior of countries in the context of IEAs. In
the context of climate change, see Böhringer and Vogt (2004); in context of sulfur emissions, see
Murdoch and Sandler (1997a) andFinus andTjøtta (2003) and in the context of CFCs, seeMurdoch
and Sandler (1997b) and Swanson and Mason (2003). However, none of these papers include ethical
aspects.
42 We should expect that negotiators state a higher preference for equity than their actual perception.
In a survey equity comes at no cost whereas in actual negotiations equity would be associated
with lower material payoffs for industrialized countries (as this would imply for instance higher
monetary, technological or in-kind transfers from industrialized to developing countries). Such a
bias is well-known for instance from contingent valuation studies. See for instance Hanley et al.
(1997).
43 A non-obvious result in Hoel and Schneider (1997) is derived from an extension which considers
the role of transfers paid by members to non-members for increasing their abatement efforts.
However, their conclusion that transfers may have a negative impact on cooperation is ﬂawed by
their conceptual setting as I argue in Finus (2003a), Section 3.3.4.
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(B-countries). Their example illustrates that there can bemultiple equilibria, comprising
a different mix of A- and B-countries. However, given that simulations are only based
on one parameter set, no general conclusions can be drawn from this example.
A similar approach is pursued in Peters and Schuler (2006). However, there are two
differences. First, disutility does not stem from payoff differences but from abatement
differences.This assumptionhas some connection to the assumption of uniformemission
quotas discussed in Section 3.2.4. However, whereas in Section 3.2.4 the preference
for uniformity was simply assumed, in Peter and Schuler (2006) it is at least part of
the payoff function, though still exogenous. This explicit statement may be judged as
an advantage as it increases the transparency of assumptions. Second, inequality is not
simplymeasured as the deviation from themean but by the variance. This corresponds to
a wider deﬁnition of inequality. Even if a country chooses an average abatement level, this
may be associatedwith negative utility as long as this average deviates from themaximum
and minimum abatement level. Basically, Peters and Schuler conﬁrm Lange and Vogt
(2003) that if inequality aversion plays a sufﬁciently important role in countries payoff
function, the grand coalition will emerge as a stable agreement. If inequality aversion
is below this threshold, they show that multiple equilibria may emerge that range from
no cooperation to partial cooperation with almost full participation. Moreover, they
demonstrate that no correlation between inequality aversion and the size of coalitions
can be established.44
Apart from the difﬁculty to reach general conclusions about the role of inequality
aversion in the models by Lange and Vogt (2003) and Peters and Schuler (2006), there
are at least two more problems. First, there is no empirical evidence that would back
either one of the two different measures of inequality aversion or suggest another one.
For instance, in the context of global warming, fairness has been associated with the
call for different responsibilities. This may be in line with similar abatement obligations
within the group of developed countries, countries in transition and developing countries
but certainly not across groups. Of course, the models assume symmetric countries, but
even in such a setting one could imagine that the herd instinct as it has been called
by Peters and Schuler (2006) only prevails within the group of coalition members and
non-members but not among both groups. Second, neither of the two papers offers
conclusions with respect to global welfare and global abatement. Though in a symmetric
setting one may conjecture that there is a correlation between the size of stable coalitions
and global welfare as well as abatement, this has to be analyzed.
Finally, I turn to the questionnaire by Lange et al. (2007). They contacted 1695
people (of which 230 responded) working for governmental bodies and international
organizations involved in climate change policy. Questions about the importance of
six equity rules for short- and long-term climate policy were put forward. Responses
served as an input into various econometric tests. They ﬁnd that equity criteria are
generally considered as important by the respondents, though this was more important
for respondents fromdeveloping countries and countries in transition than for those from
44 A similar inconclusive result is obtained in Lange (2006). Though this model is very rich in terms
of the policy setting, the analysis is incomplete as it does not consider external stability.
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industrialized countries. The polluter pays principle (i.e., equal ratio between abatement
costs and emissions) and the poor losers principle (exemptions from abatement duties
due to very lowGDP) are themostwidely accepted equity principles.Moreover andmost
important, there is a strong correlation between the importance attached to a particular
equity criteria and the economic impact associated with it. That is, respondents favored
those equity criteria that are associated with relatively low abatement obligations for
their countries of origin.
Overall, this seems to suggest that equity criteria are just disguised means in the
political arena in order to push through strategic economic goals in negotiations.Whether
this negative conclusion holds generally will have to be investigated in future research.
In particular, one may expect that there is a bias between stated and actual preferences.
Moreover, stated preference for equity criterion of respondents may differ from those
which actually entered into agreements. Therefore, it would be interesting to investigate
not only stated but revealed preferences by investigating the correlation between the
design of actual IEAs and their implied equity principle. For instance, the equity criteria
“sovereignty rule” in Lange et al. (2007) seems to have played an important role in
the past as it is deﬁned as equal percentage reduction of current emissions, which I
referred to as uniform emission reduction quotas in Section 3.2.4. See in particular
footnote 25.
4.7 Uncertainty
The base assumptions imply that all payoff functions are known with certainty. This is
surely a heroic assumption for several reasons. For instance, the impacts of climate change
are highly uncertain. This concerns the impact of greenhouse gas concentration on the
climate, the impact of the climate on the environment and the relation between changes
of environmental quality and its evaluation by people. In particular, the large time lag
between emissions today and future environmental damages due to the accumulation
of emissions makes estimates difﬁcult. Moreover, large discontinuities are expected that
could characterize damages (e.g., threshold effects or tipping points — albedo effects,
methane release from tundra, stopping of the thermohaline circulation system, etc.; see
e.g., Clarke and Reed (1994) andGjerde et al. (1999)). However, also the prediction about
future abatement costs are difﬁcult as future abatement technologies, economic growth
and the relation between growth and emissions are not known today. This suggests
that there is uncertainty regarding the parameters of the payoff function and its exact
functional form. Moreover, we may suspect that there is also asymmetric information
(e.g., Caparrós et al. 2004). Though representative of countriesmay have some idea about
their own evaluation of the climate problem and possible solutions, they face uncertainty
about the perception of their neighbors.
In order to study the strategic implications of uncertainty, it is necessary to specify
how agents form expectations. This requires making assumptions about the distribution
of the random parameters and the functional forms. Moreover, it requires specifying
whether and how uncertainty is resolved through learning. In reality, learning is usually
imperfect, meaning that the true state of the world is only revealed gradually but never
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complete. Methodological, this would mean that believes are sequentially updated as
more information becomes available (e.g., through Bayesian learning). However, this
would lead to very complex models. Therefore, as far as I am aware, all models on
uncertainty and learning assume perfect learning. That is, if information is revealed, the
true state of the world is revealed to all countries. Despite this simpliﬁcation, clear-cut
conclusions are difﬁcult to obtain as there are basically two opposing effects.
On the one hand, the possibility that better information will be available in the future
which reduces uncertainty leads to the suggestion that abatement activities should be
delayed. For instance, it may turn out that cheaper abatement options will be available in
the future. Hence, current abatement activities may turn out to be unnecessarily costly.
In particular, if abatement today is associated with high ﬁxed costs, this can make it more
difﬁcult to switch to cheaper options in the future (Kolstad, 1996). On the other hand,
the irreversibility of greenhouse gas accumulation calls for early action in case it turns
out that climate damages are more severe than expected (Ulph, 1998). Moreover, current
stricter environmental regulation may boost technological progress, making abatement
cheaper in the future.
However, even in the simple models of Ulph (1998), Ulph and Ulph (1997), and Ulph
and Maddison (1997) it is difﬁcult to obtain general conclusions. These models consider
only two periods with a stock externality, a ﬁxed abatement technology, only uncertainty
with respect to damages, which can only be high or low (e.g., there are only two states
in the world), and two symmetric countries which may only differ in damage costs. In
the case of no learning, abatement decisions are taken on expected damages. For their
model assumptions, this case corresponds to the case of no uncertainty, except that the
value of the certain damage parameter is replaced by its mean value.45 In the case of
learning, true damages are revealed after the ﬁrst period and countries can take optimal
decisions.
These papers conﬁrm that total accumulated emissions are higher in the Nash equi-
librium than in the social optimum, with and without learning. They also show that the
value of learning (i.e., in the form of higher global welfare) is usually positive in the
social optimum, except for the special case of negatively correlated damages in which
case this value is zero. This is of course not surprising since more information should
lead to better decisions. More surprising are two ﬁndings.
First, only for speciﬁc payoff functions is it possible to conclude whether ﬁrst period
abatement levels are higher or lower with than without learning. This holds for the
Nash equilibrium and the social optimum. This suggests that no general conclusions
are possible whether early action is sensible. This qualiﬁcation gains even more momen-
tum when considering that countries are usually asymmetric, damage costs parameters
may be distributed over a large interval and future abatement costs are also uncertain.
Second, if damages are sufﬁciently negatively correlated in these models, the value of
information can become negative in the Nash equilibrium. That is, in a strategic setting,
45 They assume — as all other models do as far I am aware — that utility is linear in payoffs,
implying risk neutrality. For their payoff function the theorem of certainty equivalence holds. See
footnote 49.
58 Finus
learning can be bad. The intuition is that without learning, both countries are ex-ante
and ex-post symmetric and hence choose symmetric abatement levels in both periods.
Though abatement is below socially optimal levels, it is conducted cost-effectively as
both countries have the same abatement cost function. With learning, countries choose
different abatement levels as they ﬁnd out ex-post that their true damage costs differ.
This implies a further departure from the social optimum.
The driving force of this negative conclusion about the value of learning in a strategic
setting is also present in a simple static three country model with coalition formation in
Na and Shin (1998). Countries have the same payoff function which differs only in the
damage parameter.This parameter is uniformly distributedwith the same expected value
for all countries.Without learning, which they call ex-ante negotiations, no information is
disclosed; neither before the ﬁrst stage nor before the second stage of coalition formation.
Hence, the expected payoff from forming a coalition is the same for all countries. Hence,
the grand coalition is stable in their model. With full learning, which they call ex-post
negotiations, the true damage parameter is revealed to all countries before the ﬁrst stage.
For the base assumption of joint welfare maximization of the coalition, this implies
symmetric abatement levels within a coalition from which countries beneﬁt differently
due to different damages. Hence, as no transfers are assumed, the grand coalition is not
stable anymore in their model.46
It is evident that the conclusion on the negative value of information needs some
caution as all the models mentioned above make very speciﬁc assumptions. This is
also true for the coalition models by Kolstad (2007) and Kolstad and Ulph (2006).
Both papers consider the case of a positive correlation and no correlation of damage
parameters between an arbitrary number of countries. Contrary to the papers above,
they also ﬁnd a negative value of information in the case of a positive correlation of
uncertainty. However, their payoff function is very special: damages and abatement
costs are linear and hence optimal abatement decisions are boundary solutions, meaning
that either abatement or no abatement is optimal. Moreover, in the case of no corre-
lation of uncertainty, it turns out in these models that the value of information may
become positive.47 Such mixed evidence also holds for the case of partial learning which
means that uncertainty is resolved after the ﬁrst stage but before the second stage.
Thus, only membership decisions have to be taken without knowing the true damage
parameters.48
46 Fujita (2004) claims that this conclusion would disappear with transfers and more than three
countries. However, he wrongly claims that his stability concept of the CS-core would be identical to
internal and external stability as applied in Na and Shin (1998). Thus, results cannot be compared.
47 Also in the STACO model with uncorrelated uncertainty of abatement cost and beneﬁt parameters
(and continuous choices of abatement) it is shown in Dellink et al. (2005) that in the case of full
learning the value of information can be positive in the context of coalition formation.
48 The strong dependency on assumptions is also evident from Ulph (2004). This model is in the
tradition of the models of Rubio and Ulph (2002, 2007) on dynamic coalition formation. Despite
the assumption of symmetric players and only a dichotomous choice of abatement levels (due to
linear abatement and damage cost functions) a comparison of no learning and full learning has to
resort to simulations with mixed evidence.
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Taken together, we may conclude that uncertainty is a very important and relevant
aspect of climate change. However, our understanding what it means for the strate-
gic interaction between countries and for the prospects of cooperation is still very
basic and incomplete. The main problem is the complexity of uncertainty and learn-
ing which makes it necessary to work with very simple models which do not allow
drawing general conclusions. Most models are static or consider only two periods,
assume symmetric countries and consider only uncertainty of climate damages. More-
over, none of the models on coalition formation considers the possibility that countries
can take actions to reduce uncertainty. For instance, apart from the possibility to invest
in research and development in order to reduce scientiﬁc uncertainty, there may be the
possibility that increased abatement efforts reduce the spread of uncertain damages. If
decision-makers are sufﬁciently risk averse, this could provide an incentive for more
cooperation.49
4.8 Coordination
The claim that IEAs have to be self-enforcing rests on the observation that there is
no supranational authority with enforcement power. Though I agree with this view,
this neglects at least two issues. From a positive point of view the question arises why
governments resort to international lawwhen they have disputes about the interpretation
of treaties or accuse other parties for not meeting their obligations? Moreover, there are
international organizations like UNEP, the World Bank, and the WTO that are involved
in transboundary environmental externalities in one way or another. For instance, the
WTO is involved in settling trade disputes also related to environmental standards.
UNEP coordinates some environmental policies and calls for instance for increasing
efforts to combat global warming. The World Bank manages some projects related to
the CDM and the Global Environmental Facility. Ignoring such phenomena in models
means simply that no rationale can be provided for the existence of these institutions.
From a normative point of view the question arises whether these or other interna-
tional institutions, even though they cannot enforce IEAs, cannot play a constructive
role as coordinators or mediators. This concerns for instance the stage of negotiation,
signature, ratiﬁcation, and implementation of an IEA. Also international law may at least
provide some guidance of good conduct. Again, ignoring such phenomena may mean
to ignore relevant instruments for increasing international cooperation in mitigating
transboundary environmental problems.
Taken together, it would be important to clarify how these institutions have been
evolved over time and their impact for actual treaty making. Hence, I would strongly
advocate supplementing game theoretic analyses by insights from international law, insti-
tutional economics and political sciences, to name only three disciplines, respectively
49 Such an idea is pursued in Endres and Ohl (2000, 2002, 2003). They show in a simple static
prisoners’ dilemma game that if agents are sufﬁciently risk averse and cooperation can reduce the
spread of uncertainty of payoffs, partial or full cooperation can be an equilibrium.
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methods. That this can be a successful strategy shall be brieﬂy illustrated with two exam-
ples. Though both examples remain in the domain of game theory and do not take an
evolutionary perspective, they provide at least some hint how such a research strategy
could look like.
In Finus and Rundshagen (2006b) it is shown that in the case of multiple stable
coalitions a third party can bring about a Pareto-improvement to all countries. This
third party can help to coordinate participation strategies, despite it has no enforcement
power.50 Though this model is very simple, it is easy to imagine that a third party may
also be successful in coordinating abatement strategies. Moreover, in richer models,
coordination may be extended to many other aspects of the design of IEAs, like transfer
payments, monitoring, and dispute settlement.
Another interesting aspect of coordination is analyzed in Carraro et al. (2004),
Haeringer and Courtois (2005), Rubio and Casino (2005), and Rutz (2002), Chapter 6.
Though these models differ in detail, they all consider the effect of a minimum partici-
pation clause. The motivation derives from the fact that almost all IEAs concluded in the
past operate under such a clause. For instance, Rutz (2002) reports that only 2 out of 122
IEAs that he considered had no such rule. In juridical terms, a minimum participation
clause speciﬁes the number of instruments of ratiﬁcation, acceptance, approval or acces-
sion that have to be deposited before a treaty enters into force. In the game theoretic and
economic jargon, all instruments simply mean becoming a signatory and “enters into
force” means that only from now onwards agreed obligations are considered as binding
for all members to an IEA. For instance, the Kyoto Protocol required a double-trigger
before it entered into force. First, at least 55 parties had to ratify the treaty by their
national parliaments. Second, parties had to account for at least 55% of the total 1990
CO2-emissions of all Annex-B parties.
All papers mentioned above analyze this feature in the base model with symmetric
countries in a two step procedure. First, they show that a stable coalition is small without
this clause. This is because if the number of signatories increases sufﬁciently, it becomes
attractive to leave a coalition, given that all other countries remain in the coalition. More
precisely, if we let n denote the size of a coalition and n∗ the size of a stable coalition, then
coalitions for which n∗ ≥ n ≥ 1 is true are internally stable and those for which n > n∗
is true are not internally stable. Since for symmetric countries it holds that if n (n + 1) is
an internally stable (internally unstable) coalition, then n−1 (n) is an externally unstable
(externally stable) coalition, we can state: coalitions for which n∗ > n ≥ 1 are externally
unstable and those for which n ≥ n∗ are externally stable. Taken together, coalition n∗ is
internally and externally stable and hence stable.
Second, it is shown that if a minimum participation clause n# is set above the equi-
librium coalition size n∗ without such a clause, e.g., n# ≥ n∗, the coalition with n = n#
members is stable. The argument runs as follows. If the number of signatories is n = n#,
then this is a stable coalition since leaving the coalition meant that the entire coalition
would break apart. This does not pay as the payoff of a signatory with n = n# mem-
bers is higher than in the Nash equilibrium with n = 1. Since any coalition n ≥ n∗ is
50 A similar idea is analyzed in simple matrix games in Ecchia and Mariotti (1998).
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externally stable, n = n# is stable. It is also argued that a coalition with n > n# ≥ n∗
members cannot be stable because it is not internally stable and the threat of a complete
break-up of the coalition would be lost. Of course, setting the minimum participation
strictly below n∗ cannot be an equilibrium as a coalition for which n < n∗ is true is not
externally stable.
All papers conclude that a minimum participation clause works like a coordination
device. It improves upon the prospects of cooperation because global welfare increases
with the coalition size and n# ≥ n∗. Moreover, in Carraro et al. (2004) the choice of the
minimum participation clause n# is endogenized. This basically means to show that all
countries are ex-ante (without knowingwhether theywill be a signatory or non-signatory)
better off with proposing n#∗ than any other proposal n# = n#∗. They conclude that for
the most common payoff functions countries will agree to set the minimum participation
n#∗ to full participation.
I go along with this conclusion and also think that these contributions help to explain
an institutional feature of actual treaty-making. However, I have two reservations.
First, the question arises whether it is credible to assume that a member in a coalition
with n = n# > n∗ members should expect that leaving the coalition causes the entire
coalition to break up into singletons. After all, all papers conclude that a coalition with
n∗ members is proﬁtable and stable without clause. I also doubt whether a coalition with
n > n# members cannot be stable. If countries are not myopic, then they know that a
deviation may trigger further deviations. Hence, if the payoff of a signatory at n > n#
was larger than as a non-signatory at n = n# deviation would not pay. Hence, a coalition
with n > n# can be stable. This last remark may also help to solve the following puzzle.
Second, as Rutz (2002) points out, in almost all IEAs that he investigated the number
of participants exceeds the minimum requirement — a phenomenon which cannot be
explained by the models mentioned above. With my small modiﬁcation, this observation
could be accommodated easily.
5 SUMMARY
This paper showed that the game theoretic analyses of international environmental agree-
ments (IEAs) can provide interesting and policy relevant insights. This was illustrated
with results derived from an empirical climate module linked to a game theoretic module
called STACO model in Section 3. The focus was on the impacts of some institutional
rules of IEAs (called the design of an agreement) on the success of cooperation. It was
argued that qualitative conclusions appear robust as they are conﬁrmed by sensitivity
analyses and are also conﬁrmed by the CWSmodel for a similar set of assumptions. How-
ever, it also was pointed out that the STACO model as well as many other current models
still leave much room for improvement. Many important aspects of actual treaty making
are not captured. On the one hand, this limits the predictive power of these models in the
sense of a positive analysis. On the other hand, this implies that not all opportunities for
the improvement of stable and successful cooperation have been explored in the sense of
a normative analysis.
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For these reasons, the assumptions underlying the results in Section 3 were critically
reviewed in Section 4. On the one hand, shortcomings were identiﬁed and it was argued
why improvements are important as well as possible directions for future research were
suggested. On the other hand, some of the literature was reviewed that, at least in a ﬁrst
step, have already addressed some of these shortcomings. It became evident that despite
many papers have been written since Mäler’s paper on the acid rain game appeared in
1989, using game theory to study the prospects and limits of cooperation in the context
of transboundary environmental externalities, there are still plenty of opportunities to
contribute to this avenue of research. In fact, I would argue, there are not only plenty
of opportunities, but also a serious need to improve and further develop current models
in order to provide policy guidance for the design of future IEAs. The current negoti-
ations about a Post-Kyoto Protocol to tackle the problem of global warming (after the
Kyoto Protocol terminates in 2012), with the hope to improve upon participation and
enforcement, is currently probably the most prominent example underscoring this need.
However, it is and will certainly not remain the only reason why more research on global
environmental governance with the tools of game theory will be needed in the future.51
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